

**COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION**

IN THE MATTER OF)
JOSSELIN SANCHEZ)

Case No. 2025-031

FINAL DECISION

Pursuant to 555 CMR 1.10(1), a Hearing Officer was assigned to conduct an adjudicatory proceeding regarding this matter on behalf of the Massachusetts Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission (“Commission”).

Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 30A, § 11(7) and 11(8), and 555 CMR 1.10(4)(e)2., the Hearing Officer issued an Initial Decision and Order, and Josselin Sanchez (“Respondent”) had thirty (30) days to provide the Commission with written objections. No objections were received.

After careful review and consideration, the Commission voted to affirm and adopt the Initial Decision of the Hearing Officer.

For the above reasons, the Motion for Default and Final Decision filed by the Division of Police Standards is hereby **granted**. See 555 CMR 1.10(4). The Respondent was afforded the opportunity for a full and fair hearing. See M.G.L. c. 30A, § 10 (providing that, “[i]n conducting adjudicatory proceedings,” “agencies shall afford all parties an opportunity for full and fair hearing,” and “[u]nless otherwise provided by any law, agencies may” “place on any party the responsibility of requesting a hearing if the agency notifies [the party] in writing of [the party’s] right to a hearing and of [the party’s] responsibility to request the hearing” and “make informal disposition of any adjudicatory proceeding by” “default”), § 13 (providing that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, no agency shall revoke or refuse to renew any license unless it has first afforded the licensee an opportunity for hearing in conformity with [§§ 10, 11, and 12],” but “[t]his section shall not apply” “[w]here the revocation, suspension or refusal to renew is based solely upon failure of the licensee to file timely reports, schedules, or applications . . .”), incorporated by reference in M.G.L. c. 6E, § 10(f) and 555 CMR 1.10(4).

The Commission finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Respondent is not fit for duty as an officer and is dangerous to the public, has a pattern of unprofessional police conduct that may escalate, was suspended by the appointing agency for disciplinary reasons and any appeal of the suspension is completed, and has repeated sustained internal affairs complaints for the same or different offenses. See M.G.L. c. 6E, § 10(a)(xvi), 10(b)(iii), 10(b)(iv), and 10(b)(v). **Thus, the Respondent’s certification is hereby revoked.**

The Executive Director shall take the necessary steps to publish the Respondent’s name in the National Decertification Index. See M.G.L. c. 6E, §§ 10(g), 13(b).

This is the final decision of the Commission. M.G.L. c. 30A, § 11(8); 555 CMR 1.10(4)(e).

By vote of the Commission on September 25, 2025.

In accordance with M.G.L. c. 30A, § 14 and M.G.L. c. 6E, § 10(f), the Respondent may commence an appeal to the Superior Court within thirty (30) days to the extent allowed by law. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the Respondent, or the Respondent's attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Commission, in the time and manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).

Margaret R. Hinkle

Hon. Margaret R. Hinkle (Ret.), Chair

Notice: Josselin Sanchez, Respondent
Tara L. Chisholm, Esq., Commission Enforcement Counsel
Division of Police Standards
Shaun Martinez, Esq., Deputy Director, Division of Police Standards
Chelsea Police Department, Law Enforcement Agency
Collective Bargaining Unit
Suffolk County District Attorney's Office

**COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION**

IN THE MATTER OF)
JOSSELIN SANCHEZ)

Case No. 2025-031

INITIAL DECISION

I. Introduction

At issue in this matter is whether this proceeding brought by the Massachusetts Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission (“Commission”) should now terminate with a default decision in the Commission’s favor, pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws chapter 30A, § 10(2), 801 CMR 1.01(7)(a), and 555 CMR 1.10(4). Josselin Sanchez (“Respondent”) did not answer, appear, or defend the allegations of misconduct against her in the Order to Show Cause (“OTSC”). Nor did she respond to mailings delivered to her by the Division of Police Standards (“Division”). For the reasons stated below, I recommend that the Commission grant the Division’s Motion for Default and Final Decision (“Motion”), adopt this Initial Decision as its Final Decision and determine the discipline that should be imposed against the Respondent.

II. Procedural History

1. The Division served the Respondent with an OTSC by USPS Priority Mail on June 13, 2025, addressed to the Respondent’s last known home address. Attachment 1; see Att. 3 n.1.

The record indicates that the OTSC was delivered on June 17, 2025. Att. 2.

2. The OTSC contained the allegations against the Respondent and notification of the obligation to file an answer or otherwise respond to the allegations within twenty-one days.

Att. 1. The OTSC stated that, if a responsive and timely answer was not filed, the Commission may act. Att. 1. In particular, the Respondent was notified that if an answer to the allegations in the OTSC is not filed, the Commission may enter a Final Decision and Order that assumes the

truth of the allegations in the OTSC and that the Commission may take action against the Respondent's certification, including granting, in full, the action contemplated in the OTSC.

Att. 1.

3. The Motion was mailed by the Division to the Respondent by USPS Priority Mail on July 15, 2025, to the same last known address. Att. 3 n.1 and Att. 4. I take administrative notice that the OTSC was attached as an exhibit to the Motion.

4. By operation of law, the Commission may presume that the Respondent received both the OTSC and the Motion, as discussed below. The Respondent failed to respond to either the OTSC or the Motion.

III. Allegations Contained in the OTSC

1. On July 1, 2021, the Respondent was automatically certified as a police officer in Massachusetts pursuant to St. 2020, c. 253, § 102, an Act Relative to Justice, Equity and Accountability in Law Enforcement in the Commonwealth, and she was recertified on July 1, 2024. The Commission suspended the Respondent's law enforcement certification on May 15, 2025, and it remains suspended to date.

2. The Respondent was employed as a law enforcement officer at the Chelsea Police Department ("CPD") from February 26, 2018, until her resignation on or about July 22, 2024. At the time of her resignation, the Respondent was the subject of an internal affairs investigation stemming from an incident, described herein, which took place on or about July 7, 2024, within the city of Revere.

3. On or about July 7, 2024, the Respondent was at an establishment, Capri, in Revere, Massachusetts, after midnight. While there, she consumed multiple alcoholic beverages in a short period of time, before leaving the establishment in her motor vehicle.

4. After the Respondent left the establishment, and [REDACTED], the Respondent [REDACTED] at an intersection in Revere. The Respondent

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

5. Immediately after [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

6. The other driver called 911 and reported the incident, providing a description of the Respondent, her vehicle, and her license plate number. The Respondent did not contact the Revere police to report either accident or the altercation with the passenger of the other vehicle. Furthermore, when ultimately reached by CPD after the Revere police reported her involvement to CPD, the Respondent initially denied any involvement in the incident until she was informed that video of part of the incident existed.

7. On or about August 5, 2024, CPD issued its internal investigation report relating to the above allegations relating to the July 7, 2024 incident and sustained the allegations, finding that the Respondent violated the following CPD Rules and Regulations: Rule 4.1 - Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Rule 10.15 Criminal Conduct.

8. On October 23, 2024, the Respondent was [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On February 12, 2025, [REDACTED]. Id.

Prior Disciplinary History.

9. On January 10, 2020, the CPD sustained allegations of misconduct against the Respondent for becoming highly intoxicated at the CPD holiday party held on or about December 19, 2019, and requiring assistance from multiple CPD officers, both on and off duty, throughout the course of the evening. At one point, the Respondent, who was still highly intoxicated, drove her vehicle briefly in the presence of multiple officers who had been called in to assist with her. The Respondent was then taken into protective custody, transported to the station, and placed in a detention cell due to her intoxication. The Respondent was issued a 5-day suspension.

10. On or about January 17, 2023, the CPD sustained allegations of misconduct against the Respondent for engaging in a verbal dispute on December 3, 2022, with a superior officer after being directed to perform a task that she refused to do immediately. The Respondent had been warned about similar behavior in the past. As a result of this conduct and in conjunction with the internal affairs case outlined in paragraph 11 below, the Respondent entered into a Last Chance Agreement and was issued a 60-day suspension.

11. On or about January 9, 2023, the CPD sustained allegations of misconduct against the Respondent for her conduct on or about December 4, 2022. On that date, the Respondent called in sick for her shift at the CPD, although she was not ill. Instead of reporting for duty, the Respondent drank alcohol throughout the afternoon at a local restaurant and was involved in a motor vehicle crash as a passenger. When Massachusetts State troopers arrived at the crash, the Respondent was verbally abusive and highly uncooperative, telling them she had not been in the

vehicle at the time of the accident and fabricating several different accounts of how she came to arrive at the scene. The Respondent entered into a Last Chance Settlement Agreement along with a 60-day suspension. As part of the agreement, the Respondent was subject to immediate termination if she was involved in any further incidents, on or off duty, where drugs or alcohol were deemed to be a contributing factor.

12. On November 21, 2024, the Commission directed the Division to open a preliminary inquiry to investigate the above-described allegations against the Respondent.

13. On May 15, 2025, the Commission accepted the Division's report of preliminary inquiry and voted to initiate adjudicatory proceedings against the Respondent.

IV. Attachments

In ruling on this matter, I have considered the Motion filed by the Division and the following attachments:

Attachment 1: OTSC with a certificate of service, dated June 13, 2025.

Attachment 2: OTSC USPS Priority Mail tracking, indicating delivery June 17, 2025.

Attachment 3: Motion for Default and Final Decision, dated July 15, 2025.

Attachment 4: Motion for Default USPS Priority Mail tracking, indicating delivery
July 17, 2025.

I take administrative notice of all papers filed in this case, as well as chapter 6E and Commission regulations. See M.G.L. c. 30A, § 11(5).

V. Legal Basis for Commission Disciplinary Action

1. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 6E, § 3(a):

The commission shall have all powers necessary or convenient to carry out and effectuate its purposes, including, but not limited to, the power to:

(1) act as the primary civil enforcement agency for violations of [chapter 6E]; . . .

(4) deny an application or limit, condition, restrict, revoke or suspend a certification, or

fine a person certified for any cause that the commission deems reasonable; . . .
(23) restrict, suspend or revoke certifications issued under [chapter 6E];
(24) conduct adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with chapter 30A; . . .

2. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 6E, § 10(a)(xvi): “[t]he commission shall . . . revoke an officer’s certification if the commission finds by clear and convincing evidence that . . . the officer is not fit for duty as an officer and the officer is dangerous to the public, as determined by the commission.”

3. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 6E, § 10(b)(iii), “[t]he commission may . . . suspend or revoke an officer’s certification if the commission finds by clear and convincing evidence that the officer . . . has a pattern of unprofessional police conduct that [the] commission believes may escalate.”

4. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 6E, § 10(b)(iv), “[t]he commission may . . . suspend or revoke an officer’s certification if the commission finds by clear and convincing evidence that the officer . . . was suspended or terminated by their appointing agency for disciplinary reasons, and any appeal of said suspension or termination is completed.”

5. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 6E, § 10(b)(v), “[t]he commission may . . . suspend or revoke an officer’s certification if the commission finds by clear and convincing evidence that the officer . . . has repeated sustained internal affairs complaints, for the same or different offenses.”

6. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 6E, § 10(g), the Commission shall publish any revocation order and findings and shall provide all revocation information to the National Decertification Index (“NDI”).

7. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 6E, § 10(h), the Commission may institute a disciplinary hearing after an officer’s appointing agency has issued a final disposition on the alleged misconduct.

VI. Notice

The Respondent was notified at her last known address by the OTSC that if she did not file an answer or otherwise respond to the allegations in the OTSC in a timely manner, the Commission could enter a Final Decision and Order that assumes the truth of the allegations in the OTSC. In addition, the notice informed her that the Commission may take particular action against her certification, including granting in full the relief contemplated in the OTSC. These advisories were sufficient to place her on notice of the consequences of any default. See Lawless v. Bd. of Registration in Pharmacy, 466 Mass. 1010, 1010 n.1, 1011 (2013) (concluding that pharmacist had “ample notice,” where he was informed that “failure to appear at any hearing would result in entry of default and that, in the event of default, the board could enter a final decision accepting as true the allegations contained in the show cause order”); Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 396 Mass. 533, 539 (1986) (holding that default provision did not violate due process, as it “afford[ed] the respondent reasonable procedural safeguards for notice and an opportunity to be heard.”). Despite being afforded the opportunity to do so, the Respondent has failed to file an answer, request an adjudicatory hearing, or otherwise respond.

On July 15, 2025, the Division moved for a default judgment and final decision and served the Motion, with the OTSC and OTSC tracking information attached as exhibits, by USPS Priority Mail with tracking information to the Respondent’s last known address as indicated in the Respondent’s testimony in an interview with the Division and by the Respondent’s email correspondence with the Division. Att. 3.

The Commission provided sufficient notice by delivering the OTSC and the Motion using USPS Priority Mail. Under Massachusetts case law, there is a presumption that the addressee

receives properly deposited mail. See Espinal’s Case, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 152, 152-53, 156 (2020) (citing Eveland v. Lawson, 240 Mass. 99, 103 (1921) (“The depositing of a letter in the post office, properly addressed, postage prepaid, to a person at his place of business or residence, is prima facie evidence that it was received in the ordinary course of mails.”)); see also Commonwealth v. Crosscup, 369 Mass. 228, 239 (1975) (“Proper mailing of a letter is ‘prima facie evidence’ in civil cases of its receipt by the addressee.”). In addition, nothing in chapter 6E required the Division to take any additional steps. Nor is the Division prohibited from relying on the certification that it mailed the Motion via USPS Priority Mail delivery. See Espinal’s Case, 98 Mass. App. Ct. at 157 (stating that “on other occasions when the Legislature intended to impose a requirement for notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, it has done so explicitly”). I may presume that the Respondent received the Motion that was sent through USPS Priority Mail at her last known address.

VII. Discussion

Pursuant to 801 CMR 1.01(7)(a), a party may request through a motion that a Hearing Officer “issue any order or take any action not inconsistent with [the] law or 801 CMR 1.00.” One such action is recommending the entry of a final judgment of default where a respondent has failed to appear. Under M.G.L. c. 30A, § 10(2), an agency is specifically authorized to “make informal disposition of any adjudicatory proceeding by . . . default.” Lawless, 466 Mass. at 1011-12 (affirming that agency “ha[d] authority, in an appropriate circumstance, to dispose of an adjudicatory proceeding by default,” citing M.G.L. c. 30A, § 10, and concluding that agency’s decision to do so was not shown to be improper, where the party failed to appear after the first day of hearing). That step is warranted here. The Commission has afforded the Respondent an

opportunity for a full and fair hearing as required by M.G.L. c. 30A, §§ 10, 11(1) and 801 CMR 1.01(4)(c).

In University Hosp., 396 Mass. at 538-39, the Supreme Judicial Court rejected the notion that due process standards were violated by an agency rule that provided sanctions for a party's default upon failure to respond interrogatories. The court concluded that the provisions of the agency rule "afford . . . reasonable procedural safeguards for notice and an opportunity to be heard," noting that respondent was given clear notice of the consequences, could obtain an extension of time, petition for a default to be vacated, and seek judicial review of the entire proceedings. Id. at 539. In the case before the Commission, the OTSC and the Motion (both sent by USPS with tracking) provided the Respondent with notice of the consequences of a failure to appear or defend in this matter, as well as an opportunity to object. Atts. 1 and 3. The Respondent could have sought more time to respond under 801 CMR 1.01(4)(e), (7)(a), and (7)(d). Therefore, the entry of a default judgment by the Commission is both legal and proper.

By reason of the Respondent's default, and upon consideration of the Division's Motion, I recommend that the Commission grant the Motion. In addition, I recommend that the Commission find that the allegations in the OTSC and the violations of the statutes and regulations stated therein are deemed admitted and established. See Lawless, 466 Mass. at 1010-12 & n.1; Univ. Hosp., 396 Mass. at 534, 538-39.

VIII. Conclusion

The Division's Motion should be granted for the reasons stated above. I recommend that the Commission find the allegations to be supported, make this Initial Decision final and determine the appropriate discipline. In accordance with the provisions of 555 CMR

1.10(4)(e)2.b., the officer has thirty days to file written objections to the Initial Decision with the Commission.

SO ORDERED.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Judith A. Cowin".

Hon. Judith A. Cowin (Ret.)
Hearing Officer

Date: July 30, 2025

Notice: Josselin Sanchez, Respondent
Tara L. Chisholm, Esq., Commission Enforcement Counsel
Division of Police Standards
Shaun Martinez, Esq., Deputy Director, Division of Police Standards
Chelsea Police Department, Law Enforcement Agency
Collective Bargaining Unit
Suffolk County District Attorney's Office