

**COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION**

IN THE MATTER OF
DAVID GRANGER

)
)

Case No. 2025-001

FINAL DECISION

Pursuant to 555 CMR 1.10(1), a Hearing Officer was assigned to conduct an adjudicatory proceeding regarding this matter on behalf of the Massachusetts Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission (“Commission”).

Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 30A, §§ 11(7) and (8) and 555 CMR 1.10(4)(e)2., the Hearing Officer issued an Initial Decision and Order, and David Granger (“Respondent”) had thirty (30) days to provide written objections to the Commission. No objections were received.

After careful review and consideration, the Commission voted to affirm and adopt the Initial Decision of the Hearing Officer.

For the above reasons, the Motion for Default and Final Decision filed by the Division of Police Standards is hereby **granted**. See 555 CMR 1.10(4). The Respondent was afforded the opportunity for a full and fair hearing. See M.G.L. c. 30A, § 10 (providing that, “[i]n conducting adjudicatory proceedings,” “agencies shall afford all parties an opportunity for full and fair hearing,” and “[u]nless otherwise provided by any law, agencies may” “place on any party the responsibility of requesting a hearing if the agency notifies [the party] in writing of [the party’s] right to a hearing and of [the party’s] responsibility to request the hearing” and “make informal disposition of any adjudicatory proceeding by” “default”), § 13 (providing that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, no agency shall revoke or refuse to renew any license unless it has first afforded the licensee an opportunity for hearing in conformity with [§§ 10, 11, and 12],” but “[t]his section shall not apply” “[w]here the revocation, suspension or refusal to renew is based solely upon failure of the licensee to file timely reports, schedules, or applications . . .”), incorporated by reference in M.G.L. c. 6E, § 10(f) and 555 CMR 1.10(4).

The Commission finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Respondent engaged in intimidation of a witness, is not fit for duty as an officer and is dangerous to the public, has engaged in a pattern of unprofessional police conduct that the Commission believes may escalate, and was suspended or terminated by their appointing agency for disciplinary reasons, and any appeal of said suspension or termination is completed. M.G.L. c. 6E, §§ 10(a)(xiv), 10(a)(xvi), 10(b)(iii), and 10(b)(iv). **Thus, the Respondent’s certification is hereby revoked.**

The Executive Director shall take the necessary steps to publish the Respondent’s name in the National Decertification Index. See M.G.L. c. 6E, §§ 10(g), 13(b).

This is the final decision of the Commission. M.G.L. c. 30A, § 11(8); 555 CMR 1.10(4)(e).
By vote of the Commission on April 17, 2025.

In accordance with M.G.L. c. 30A, § 14 and M.G.L. c. 6E, § 10(f), the Respondent may commence an appeal to the Superior Court within thirty (30) days to the extent allowed by law. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the Respondent, or the Respondent's attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Commission, in the time and manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Margaret R. Hinkle".

Hon. Margaret R. Hinkle (Ret.), Chair

**COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION**

IN THE MATTER OF
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Case No. 2025-001

INITIAL DECISION

I. Introduction

At issue in this matter is whether this proceeding brought by the Massachusetts Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission (“Commission”) should now terminate with a default decision in the Commission’s favor, pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws chapter 30A, § 10(2), 801 CMR 1.01(7)(a), and 555 CMR 1.10(4). David Granger (“Respondent”) did not answer, appear, or defend the allegations of misconduct against him in the Order to Show Cause (“OTSC”). Nor did he respond to mailings delivered to him by the Division of Police Standards (“Division”). For the reasons stated below, I recommend that the Commission grant the Division’s Motion for Default and Final Decision (“Motion”), adopt this Initial Decision as its Final Decision and determine what discipline should be imposed against the Respondent.

II. Procedural History

1. The Division served the Respondent with an OTSC by USPS Priority Mail on January 3, 2025, addressed to the Respondent’s last known address. Attachment 1. The record indicates that the OTSC was delivered on January 10, 2025. Att. 2.

2. The OTSC contained the allegations against the Respondent and notification of the obligation to file an answer or otherwise respond to the allegations within 21 days. Att. 1. The OTSC stated that, if a responsive and timely answer was not filed, the Commission may act. Att. 1. In particular, the Respondent was notified that if an answer to the allegations in the OTSC is not filed, the Commission may enter a Final Decision and Order that assumes the truth

of the allegations in the OTSC and that the Commission may take action against the Respondent's certification, including granting, in full, the action contemplated in the OTSC.

Att. 1.

3. The Motion was mailed by the Division to the Respondent by USPS Priority Mail on February 5, 2025, to the same last known address. Atts. 3 n.1 and 4. I take administrative notice that the OTSC was attached as an exhibit to the Motion.

4. By operation of law, the Commission may presume that the Respondent received both the OTSC and the Motion, as discussed below. The Respondent failed to respond to either the OTSC or the Motion.

III. Allegations Contained in the OTSC

1. On July 1, 2021, the Respondent was automatically certified as a police officer in Massachusetts pursuant to St. 2020, c. 253, § 102, an Act Relative to Justice, Equity and Accountability in Law Enforcement in the Commonwealth. Throughout the time of the allegations detailed below, the Respondent was a law enforcement officer employed by the Pittsfield Police Department ("PPD") and thereafter at the Massachusetts State Police ("MSP"). The Respondent's certification was suspended on May 5, 2023, and remains suspended as of the date of this Initial Decision.

2. The Respondent was employed as a law enforcement officer at the PPD from March 20, 2016, to January 19, 2019, and was the subject of prior sustained findings and/or discipline. On May 28, 2018, the Respondent received two "Documented Verbal Reprimands" for violations of PPD Policy and Procedures, for his handling of two different domestic violence calls that month.

i. The first reprimand was issued as a result of the Respondent's actions at the home of

a May 17, 2018 domestic violence call, wherein the Respondent inappropriately doubted as to whether a suspect, alleged to have grabbed his partner by the throat and thrown her on the bed, should be arrested at the scene before speaking to the victim in-person. The suspect reportedly possessed a firearm and was suicidal. Because the victim fled the residence with her child, she had relayed the information to officers over the phone.

- ii. The following day, May 18, 2018, the Respondent failed to serve a 209A Emergency Restraining Order upon a defendant at his place of employment after the victim told the Respondent that the defendant was at work and provided the address of his employer. Rather than serve the emergency order that night, the Respondent asked the victim to tell the defendant to pick the order up at the station the following morning. The Respondent downplayed the victim's reasons for requesting the order to his Lieutenant, stating that the victim and the defendant do not live together and that there was no physical assault.

3. The Respondent was employed as a law enforcement officer at the MSP from January 2, 2019, until his termination and dishonorable discharge on July 11, 2024.

4. On June 13, 2020, in the city of Pittsfield, Massachusetts, the Respondent, while intoxicated, forcefully grabbed his girlfriend (hereinafter [REDACTED]) by both arms and pushed her against a wall, slowly and forcefully pushing her downwards. As he did so, [REDACTED] head was pushed into a table or radiator located on the landing of a staircase, causing injuries, including a laceration to her head.

5. As [REDACTED] struggled to break free of the Respondent, the Respondent pulled at her legs as she crawled up the stairs. When [REDACTED] later tried to use her cellular phone to call for police or

medical assistance, the Respondent prevented her from using it for a period of time, restraining her by the arms and preventing her from leaving her bedroom.

6. After the altercation, [REDACTED] sought medical treatment and required multiple staples to repair the laceration to her head.

7. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

8. On June 15, 2023, the Commission directed the Division to open a preliminary inquiry to investigate the above-described allegations against the Respondent.

9. On or about December 18, 2023, the MSP issued its internal investigation report relating to the above allegations of abuse by the Respondent against [REDACTED] and sustained allegations that:

- i. the Respondent committed a domestic assault and battery on [REDACTED];
- ii. the Respondent committed the offense of intimidation of a witness by interfering with [REDACTED] ability to use her cellular telephone or otherwise leave her bedroom in order to contact the police and/or obtain medical assistance; and
- iii. the Respondent, while intoxicated, was involved in a physical altercation with [REDACTED] that resulted in [REDACTED] suffering injury.

10. On July 9, 2024, an MSP Trial Board Hearing was held, and all three allegations were sustained.

11. On or about July 11, 2024, the Respondent was terminated and dishonorably discharged by the MSP. The Respondent did not appeal the termination.

IV. Attachments

In ruling on this matter, I have considered the following attachments:

Attachment 1: OTSC with a certificate of service, dated January 3, 2025.

Attachment 2: OTSC USPS Priority Mail tracking, indicating delivery on January 10, 2025.

Attachment 3: Motion for Default and Final Decision, dated February 5, 2025.

Attachment 4: Motion for Default USPS Priority Mail tracking, indicating delivery on February 8, 2025.

I take administrative notice of all papers filed in this case, as well as chapter 6E and Commission regulations. See M.G.L. c. 30A, § 11(5).

V. Legal Basis for Commission Disciplinary Action

1. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 6E, § 3(a):

The [C]ommission shall have all powers necessary or convenient to carry out and effectuate its purposes, including, but not limited to, the power to:

- (1) act as the primary civil enforcement agency for violations of [chapter 6E]; . . .
- (4) deny an application or limit, condition, restrict, revoke or suspend a certification, or fine a person certified for any cause that the commission deems reasonable; . . .
- (23) restrict, suspend or revoke certifications issued under [chapter 6E];
- (24) conduct adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with chapter 30A; . . .

2. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 6E, § 10(a)(xiv), “[t]he [C]ommission shall . . . revoke an officer’s certification if the [C]ommission finds by clear and convincing evidence that . . . the officer engaged in the intimidation of a witness, as defined by section 13B of chapter 268.”

3. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 6E, § 10(a)(xvi), “[t]he [C]ommission shall . . . revoke an officer’s certification if the [C]ommission finds by clear and convincing evidence that . . . the officer is not fit for duty as an officer and . . . is dangerous to the public, as determined by the [C]ommission.”

4. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 6E, § 10(b)(iii), “[t]he [C]ommission may . . . suspend or revoke an officer’s certification if the [C]ommission finds by clear and convincing evidence that the officer . . . has a pattern of unprofessional police conduct that [the] [C]ommission believes may escalate.”

5. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 6E, § 10(b)(iv), “[t]he [C]ommission may . . . suspend or revoke an officer’s certification if the [C]ommission finds by clear and convincing evidence that the officer . . . was suspended or terminated by their appointing agency for disciplinary reasons and any appeal of said suspension or termination is completed.”

6. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 6E, § 10(g), the Commission shall publish any revocation order and findings and shall provide all revocation information to the National Decertification Index (“NDI”).

7. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 6E, § 10(h), the Commission may institute a disciplinary hearing after an officer’s appointing agency has issued a final disposition regarding the alleged misconduct.

VI. Notice

The Respondent was notified at his last known address by the OTSC that if he did not file an answer or otherwise respond to the allegations in the OTSC in a timely manner, the Commission could enter a Final Decision and Order that assumes the truth of the allegations in the OTSC. In addition, the notice informed him that the Commission may take particular action against his certification, including granting in full the relief contemplated in the OTSC. These advisories were sufficient to place him on notice of the consequences of any default. See Lawless v. Bd. of Registration in Pharmacy, 466 Mass. 1010, 1010 n.1, 1011 (2013) (pharmacist had “ample notice,” where he was informed that “failure to appear at any hearing would result in

entry of default and that, in the event of default, the board could enter a final decision accepting as true the allegations contained in the show cause order”); Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 396 Mass. 533, 539 (1986) (default provision did not violate due process, as it “afford[ed] the [R]espondent reasonable procedural safeguards for notice and an opportunity to be heard”). Despite being afforded the opportunity to do so, the Respondent has failed to file an answer, request an adjudicatory hearing, or otherwise respond.

On February 5, 2025, the Division moved for a default judgment and final decision and served the Motion, with the OTSC and OTSC tracking information attached as exhibits, by USPS Priority Mail with tracking information to the Respondent’s last known address as indicated by a CLEAR search conducted by the Division. Att. 3.

The Commission provided sufficient notice by delivering the OTSC and the Motion using USPS Priority Mail. Under Massachusetts case law, there is a presumption that the addressee receives properly deposited mail. See Espinal’s Case, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 152, 152-53, 156 (2020) (citing Eveland v. Lawson, 240 Mass. 99, 103 (1921) (“The depositing of a letter in the post office, properly addressed, postage prepaid, to a person at his place of business or residence, is prima facie evidence that it was received in the ordinary course of mails.”)); see also Commonwealth v. Crosscup, 369 Mass. 228, 239 (1975) (“Proper mailing of a letter is ‘prima facie evidence’ in civil cases of its receipt by the addressee.”). Further, nothing in chapter 6E required the Division to take any additional steps. Nor is the Division prohibited from relying on the certification that it mailed the Motion via USPS Priority Mail delivery. See Espinal’s Case, 98 Mass. App. Ct. at 157 (“[O]n other occasions when the Legislature intended to impose a requirement for notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, it has done so explicitly”). I

may presume that the Respondent received the Motion that was sent through USPS Priority Mail at his last known address.

VII. Discussion

Pursuant to 801 CMR 1.01(7)(a), a party may request through a motion that a Hearing Officer “issue any order or take any action not inconsistent with [the] law or 801 CMR 1.00.” One such action is recommending the entry of a final judgment of default where a respondent has failed to appear. Under M.G.L. c. 30A, § 10(2), an agency is specifically authorized to “make informal disposition of any adjudicatory proceeding by . . . default.” Lawless, 466 Mass. at 1011-12 (agency “ha[d] authority, in an appropriate circumstance, to dispose of an adjudicatory proceeding by default,” citing M.G.L. c. 30A, § 10; and agency’s decision to do so was not shown to be improper, where the party failed to appear after the first day of hearing). That step is warranted here. The Commission has afforded the Respondent an opportunity for a full and fair hearing as required by M.G.L. c. 30A, §§ 10, 11(1) and 801 CMR 1.01(4)(c).

In University Hosp., 396 Mass. at 538-39, the Supreme Judicial Court rejected the notion that due process standards were violated by an agency rule that provided sanctions for a party’s default upon receiving interrogatories. The court concluded that the provisions of the agency rule “afford . . . reasonable procedural safeguards for notice and an opportunity to be heard,” noting that respondent was given clear notice of the consequences, could obtain an extension of time, petition for a default to be vacated, and seek judicial review of the entire proceedings. Id. at 539. In the case before the Commission, the OTSC and the Motion (both sent by USPS with tracking) provided the Respondent with notice of the consequences of a failure to appear or defend in this matter, as well as an opportunity to object. Atts. 1 and 3. The Respondent could

have sought more time to respond under 801 CMR 1.01(4)(e), (7)(a), and (7)(d). Therefore, the entry of a default judgment by the Commission is both legal and proper.

By reason of the Respondent's default, and upon consideration of the Division's Motion, I recommend that the Commission grant the Motion. See Lawless, 466 Mass. at 1010-12 & n.1; Univ. Hosp., 396 Mass. at 538-39; Productora e Importadora de Papel, S.A. de C.V. v. Fleming, 376 Mass. 826, 833-35 (1978) (a default establishes the truth of factual allegations). In addition, I recommend that the Commission find that the allegations in the OTSC and the violations of the statutes and regulations stated therein are deemed admitted and established. See Lawless, 466 Mass. at 1010-12 & n.1; Univ. Hosp., 396 Mass. at 534, 538-39; Productora e Importadora de Papel, 376 Mass. at 833-35.

VIII. Conclusion

The Division's Motion should be granted for the reasons stated above. I recommend that the Commission find the allegations to be supported, make this Initial Decision final, and determine the appropriate discipline. In accordance with the provisions of 555 CMR 1.10(4)(e)2.b., the officer has thirty days to file written objections to the Initial Decision with the Commission.

SO ORDERED.



Hon. Kenneth J. Fishman (Ret.)
Hearing Officer

Date: March 11, 2025