COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF JOE MARTINEZ)	Case No. 2023-014		
FINAL DECISION				
Pursuant to 555 CMR 1.10(1), a Hear proceeding regarding this matter on be Commission ("Commission").				
	and Joe Martine	CMR 1.10(4)(e)(2), the Hearing Officer z ("Respondent") had thirty (30) days to jections were received.		
After careful review and consideration Initial Decision of the Hearing Office		on voted to affirm and adopt the		
Standards is hereby granted . See 55 opportunity for a full and fair hearing adjudicatory proceedings," "agencies hearing," and "[u]nless otherwise proceedings a hearing right to a hearing and of [the party's] disposition of any adjudicatory proceedings are provided in this section, no has first afforded the licensee an opposition of the party's afforded the licensee and proceedings are provided in this section, not have first afforded the licensee and proceedings are provided in this section of the licensee and proceedings are provided in this section.	25 CMR 1.10(4). 26 See M.G.L. c. as shall afford all provided by any law as if the agency not responsibility to be ding by" "defaut agency shall responsibility for heart of the licersee to the licersee to	30A, § 10 (providing that, "[i]n conducting parties an opportunity for full and fair w, agencies may" "place on any party the partifies [the party] in writing of [the party's] or request the hearing" and "make informal alt"), § 13 (providing that, "[e]xcept as woke or refuse to renew any license unless it ing in conformity with [§§ 10,11, and 12]," where the revocation suspension or refusal		
The Commission finds, by clear and	convincing evid	ence, that the Respondent		

Respondent's certification is hereby revoked.

The Executive Director shall take the necessary steps to publish the Respondent's name in the National Decertification Index. See M.G.L. c. 6E, §§ 10(g), 13(b).

This is the final decision of the Commission. M.G.L. c. 30A, § 11(8); 555 CMR 1.10(4)(e).

By vote of the Commission on January 16, 2025.

In accordance with M.G.L. c. 30A, § 14 and M.G.L. c. 6E, § 10(f), the Respondent may commence an appeal to the Superior Court within thirty (30) days to the extent allowed by law. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the Respondent, or the Respondent's attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Commission, in the time and manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).

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Hon. Margaret R. Hinkle (Ret.), Chair

Notice: Joe Martinez, Respondent

Amy C. Parker, Esq., Commission Enforcement Counsel

Division of Police Standards

Boston Police Department, Law Enforcement Agency

Collective Bargaining Unit

Norfolk County District Attorney's Office

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF)	Case No. 2023-014
JOE MARTINEZ)	

INITIAL DECISION

I. <u>Introduction</u>

At issue in this matter is whether this proceeding brought by the Massachusetts Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission ("Commission") should now terminate with a default decision in the Commission's favor, pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws chapter 30A, § 10(2), 801 CMR 1.01(7)(a), and 555 CMR 1.10(4). Joe Martinez ("Respondent") did not answer, appear, or defend the allegations of misconduct against him in the Order to Show Cause ("OTSC"). Nor did he respond to mailings delivered to him by the Division of Police Standards ("Division"). For the reasons stated below, I recommend that the Commission grant the Division's Motion for Default and Final Decision ("Motion"), adopt this Initial Decision as its Final Decision and determine what discipline should be imposed against the Respondent.

II. <u>Procedural History</u>

- 1. The Division served the Respondent with an OTSC by USPS Priority Mail on August 13, 2024, addressed to the Respondent's last known address. Attachments 1 and 3 n.1. The record indicates that the OTSC was delivered on August 16, 2024, and signed for by the Respondent on August 17, 2024. Att. 2.
- 2. The OTSC contained the allegations against the Respondent and notification of the obligation to file an answer or otherwise respond to the allegations within 21 days. Att. 1. The OTSC stated that, if a responsive and timely answer was not filed, the Commission may act.

 Att. 1. In particular, the Respondent was notified that if an answer to the allegations in the OTSC is not filed, the Commission may enter a Final Decision and Order that assumes the truth

of the allegations in the OTSC and that the Commission may take action against the Respondent's certification, including granting, in full, the action contemplated in the OTSC.

Att. 1.

- 3. The Motion was mailed by the Division to the Respondent by USPS Priority Mail on November 4, 2024, to the same last known address. Atts. 3 n.1 and 4. I take administrative notice that the OTSC was attached as an exhibit to the Motion.
- 4. The Respondent signed for the OTSC on August 17, 2024. Att. 2. And, by operation of law, the Commission may presume that the Respondent received the Motion, as discussed below. The Respondent failed to respond to either the OTSC or the Motion.
- III. <u>Allegations Contained in the OTSC</u>
- 1. On July 12, 2023, pursuant to to open a preliminary inquiry to investigate the allegation that the Respondent
- 2. As of July 12, 2023, the Respondent was certified as a police officer pursuant to St. 2020, c. 253, § 102, an Act Relative to Justice, Equity and Accountability in Law Enforcement in the Commonwealth.

3.	

IV. Attachments

In ruling on this matter, I have considered the Motion filed by the Division and the following attachments:

Attachment 1: OTSC with a certificate of service, dated August 13, 2024.

Attachment 2: OTSC USPS Priority Mail tracking, indicating delivery on August 16, 2024, and signing on August 17, 2024.

Attachment 3: Motion for Default and Final Decision, dated November 4, 2024.

Attachment 4: Motion for Default USPS Priority Mail tracking, indicating delivery on November 7, 2024.

I take administrative notice of all papers filed in this case, as well as chapter 6E and Commission regulations. See M.G.L. c. 30A, § 11(5).

V. <u>Legal Basis for Commission Disciplinary Action</u>

1. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 6E, § 3(a):

The [C]ommission shall have all powers necessary or convenient to carry out and effectuate its purposes, including, but not limited to, the power to:

- (1) act as the primary civil enforcement agency for violations of [chapter 6E]; ...
- (4) deny an application or limit, condition, restrict, revoke or suspend a certification, or fine a person certified for any cause that the commission deems reasonable; . . .
- (23) restrict, suspend or revoke certifications issued under [chapter 6E];
- (24) conduct adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with chapter 30A;

2.

- 3.
 4.
 5.
- 6. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 6E, § 10(g), the Commission shall publish any revocation order and findings and shall provide all revocation information to the National Decertification Index ("NDI").
- 7. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 6E, § 10(h), the Commission may institute a disciplinary hearing after an officer's appointing agency has issued a final disposition regarding the alleged misconduct.

VI. Notice

The Respondent signed for the OTSC, and the OTSC notified him that if he did not file an answer or otherwise respond to the allegations in the OTSC in a timely manner, the Commission could enter a Final Decision and Order that assumes the truth of the allegations in the OTSC. Att. 2. In addition, the notice informed him that the Commission may take particular action against his certification, including granting in full the relief contemplated in the OTSC. These advisories were sufficient to place him on notice of the consequences of any default. See Lawless v. Bd. of Registration in Pharmacy, 466 Mass. 1010, 1010 n.1, 1011 (2013) (concluding that pharmacist had "ample notice," where he was informed that "failure to appear at any hearing would result in entry of default and that, in the event of default, the board could enter a final decision accepting as true the allegations contained in the show cause order"); Univ. Hosp., Inc.

v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 396 Mass. 533, 539 (1986) (holding that default provision did not violate due process, as it "afford[ed] the [R]espondent reasonable procedural safeguards for notice and an opportunity to be heard"). Despite being afforded the opportunity to do so, the Respondent has failed to file an answer, request an adjudicatory hearing, or otherwise respond.

On November 4, 2024, the Division moved for a default judgment and final decision and served the Motion, with the OTSC and OTSC tracking information attached as exhibits, by USPS Priority Mail with tracking information to the Respondent's last known address as indicated by a database search conducted by the Division. Att. 3.

The Respondent signed for the OTSC on August 17, 2024. Att. 2. The Commission provided sufficient notice by delivering the Motion using USPS Priority Mail. Under Massachusetts case law, there is a presumption that the addressee receives properly deposited mail. See Espinal's Case, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 152, 152-53, 156 (2020) (citing Eveland v. Lawson, 240 Mass. 99, 103 (1921) ("The depositing of a letter in the post office, properly addressed, postage prepaid, to a person at his place of business or residence, is prima facie evidence that it was received in the ordinary course of mails.")); see also Commonwealth v. Crosscup, 369 Mass. 228, 239 (1975) ("Proper mailing of a letter is 'prima facie evidence' in civil cases of its receipt by the addressee."). Further, nothing in chapter 6E required the Division to take any additional steps. Nor is the Division prohibited from relying on the certification that it mailed the Motion via USPS Priority Mail delivery. See Espinal's Case, 98 Mass. App. Ct. at 157 (stating that "on other occasions when the Legislature intended to impose a requirement for notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, it has done so explicitly"). I may presume that the Respondent received the Motion that was sent through USPS Priority Mail at his last known address.

VII. Discussion

Pursuant to 801 CMR 1.01(7)(a), a party may request through a motion that a Hearing Officer "issue any order or take any action not inconsistent with [the] law or 801 CMR 1.00." One such action is recommending the entry of a final judgment of default where a respondent has failed to appear. Under M.G.L. c. 30A, § 10(2), an agency is specifically authorized to "make informal disposition of any adjudicatory proceeding by . . . default." Lawless, 466 Mass. at 1011-12 (affirming that agency "ha[d] authority, in an appropriate circumstance, to dispose of an adjudicatory proceeding by default," citing M.G.L. c. 30A, § 10; and concluding that agency's decision to do so was not shown to be improper, where the party failed to appear after the first day of hearing). That step is warranted here. The Commission has afforded the Respondent an opportunity for a full and fair hearing as required by M.G.L. c. 30A, §§ 10, 11(1) and 801 CMR 1.01(4)(c).

In <u>University Hosp.</u>, 396 Mass. at 538-39, the Supreme Judicial Court rejected the notion that due process standards were violated by an agency rule that provided sanctions for a party's default upon receiving interrogatories. The court concluded that the provisions of the agency rule "afford . . . reasonable procedural safeguards for notice and an opportunity to be heard," noting that the respondent was given clear notice of the consequences, could obtain an extension of time, petition for a default to be vacated, and seek judicial review of the entire proceedings. <u>Id</u>. at 539. In the case before the Commission, the OTSC and the Motion (sent by USPS with tracking) provided the Respondent with notice of the consequences of a failure to appear or defend in this matter, as well as an opportunity to object. Atts. 1, 2, and 3. The Respondent could have sought more time to respond under 801 CMR 1.01(4)(e), (7)(a), and (7)(d). Therefore, the entry of a default judgment by the Commission is both legal and proper.

By reason of the Respondent's default, and upon consideration of the Division's Motion, I recommend that the Commission grant the Motion. See Lawless, 466 Mass. at 1010-12 & n.1; Univ. Hosp., 396 Mass. at 538-39; Productora e Importadora de Papel, S.A. de C.V. v. Fleming, 376 Mass. 826, 833-35 (1978) (recognizing that a default establishes the truth of factual allegations). In addition, I recommend that the Commission find that the allegations in the OTSC and the violations of the statutes and regulations stated therein are deemed admitted and established. See Lawless, 466 Mass. at 1010-12 & n.1; Univ. Hosp., 396 Mass. at 534, 538-39; Productora e Importadora de Papel, 376 Mass. at 833-35.

VIII. Conclusion

The Division's Motion should be granted for the reasons stated above. I recommend that the Commission find the allegations to be supported, make this Initial Decision final, and determine the appropriate discipline. In accordance with the provisions of 555 CMR 1.10(4)(e)(2)(b), the officer has thirty days to file written objections to the Initial Decision with the Commission.

SO ORDERED.

Hon. Kenneth J. Fishman (Ret.)

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Hearing Officer

Date: November 14, 2024

Notice: Joe Martinez, Respondent

Amy C. Parker, Esq., Commission Enforcement Counsel

Boston Police Department, Agency Norfolk Police Department, Agency

Norfolk County District Attorney's Office

Collective Bargaining Unit